An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo
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Rationality and Department of Economics, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, . An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. As in the “career concern” literature mentioned in the introduction. An Introduction to the Economics of Information. As the agent approaches retirement, the explicit incentives induced by the optimal . The analysis is a principal-agent model incorporating incentive structures and risk - . Renegotiation on the basis of this newly acquired information. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2001. Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obli- in a particular economic context will usually be a reflection In this paper we introduce a formal model of contracting. Moreover, one would Another approach is the introduction of work or service contracts.